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ABSTRACT
Yu, Min-Chieh. M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, December 2015. A Secure Mobile
Agent E-commerce Protocol. Major Professor: Brian King.
There are many advantages of mobile agent such as delegation of tasks, asyn-
chronous processing, adaptable service in interfaces, and code shipping. Mobile agents
can be utilized in many areas such as electronic commerce, information retrieval, net-
work management, etc. The main problem with mobile agents is security. The three
basic security design goals of a system are confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The goal of this thesis concerns the property of secure purchasing by mobile agents.
First present Jalal’s anonymous authentication protocol. Next, we construct our sin-
gle mobile agent protocol based on Jalal’s authentication technique. Also, we add
some addition cryptography techniques to make the data more secure during its mi-
gration. Lastly, we build a multiple mobile agent protocol based on the single mobile
agent protocol. Here, the multiple mobile agents are capable to make the decision
and purchase the item for user.
11. INTRODUCTION
Mobile agents are mobile code that migrate from one host to another in the net-
work. A mobile agent can be used to solve many network problems such as reducing
bandwidth, network traffic, and saving space. Mobile agents can be implemented
to perform electronic trading, distributed information system, network management,
social networking, etc. One of the important applications for a mobile agent will
be e-commerce. The mobile agents can perform autonomously. Mobile agents are
able to migrate more than once. After visiting the first host, the mobile agent might
migrate further to other hosts in order to continue to collect data. The migration of
mobile agents is usually done so the agent can access resources from the hosts in the
network. When we compare mobile agents to the client-server approach we see that
the mobile agents reduce the network load and processing time. This is because the
code is moved to the data instead of the data being moved to the code. However,
there are some concerns of mobile agents such as security issues. The goal of this
paper is to construct a secure mobile agent e-commerce protocol.
Today, many people are overworked. They are working, exercising, etc. Waiting
in long lines, to shop, searching for the “best price” for items with “best quality” can
cause further frustrations. Shopping and searching for bargains today may be done
by collecting information from websites or shopping store to store. Nevertheless, it
can be time-consuming. Instead of client-server shopping approach, with the shopper
controlling the client, one can use mobile agents, which can be more efficient and
save time. We can use mobile agents to retrieve information from servers. User can
simply set requirements for their mobile agents and let the mobile agent to complete
the tasks. The user has no need to monitor mobile agents, he or she can focus on their
work, things that mobile agents cannot accomplish. For example, Alice is preparing to
attend an international conference. She needs to book the flight tickets, hotel, rental
2car. In addition, she needs to schedule some meetings with the members and prepare
the reports. Alice needs to finish all these items on her to-do list in one day. She
assigns mobile agents to finish several of her tasks. Alice sets up the requirements such
as the city, leaving date, departure time, returning date, location, brand, price, etc.
She sends out the mobile agent to search via the network based on these requirements.
Now, she has some more time to call the members, schedule meetings, and prepare
her reports. Mobile agents will use Alice’s detailed information about the flight ticket,
hotel, and rental car that they purchased from the merchants. During the searching
time, Alice has no need to worry about the tasks that she assigned to mobile agents.
In this thesis, we will focus on the privacy issues and provide technical solutions for
mobile agents. In addition, we enable mobile agents not only to searching, collecting,
comparing the particular item but also to purchase the particular item in e-commerce
system. The organization of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide math-
ematical and cryptographic tools, as well as, the security mechanisms and analysis.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the background of mobile agents. We describe the mo-
bile agent system’s basic terminology, background definition, and structure. Also,
we discuss the advantages and disadvantages about the mobile agents. In addition,
we address several applications of mobile agent. In Chapter 4, we address different
previous secure mobile agent protocol designs and approaches. We first present Sin-
gelee’s secure collection of dynamic data approaches. After that we describe Jalal’s
mobile agents electronic commerce protocol. In Chapter 5, we describe the secure
design goal of mobile agent. We present the mobile agents privacy issues along with
the concept of protocol and methods that we are using to construct a secure mobile
agent e-commerce protocol. In Chapter 6, we present a secure protocol of mobile
agent in e-commerce system. Further, we address the motivation, setup, registration,
authentication, and tracing in this protocol. In Chapter 7, we conclude this thesis
and discuss the open problems in the future work.
32. BACKGROUND MATERIAL
2.1 Computer Security Objectives
Typical computer security concerns includes: authentication, confidentiality, in-
tegrity, accountability, availability, and anonymity.
Integrity is the service that assures that the information has not been modified.
Potential concerns include data that has been exchanged, removed, or added
in time. Integrity contains two related concepts, which is data integrity and
system integrity. The goal of data integrity is to assure that information is
changed by authorized manner. The system integrity means a system is free
from unauthorized manipulation.
Authentication is an important area, concerning the integrity of the identity of
an entity, is a major concern and requirement in the security, especially in
an electronic commerce application. We need a secure authentication between
mobile agents and agencies. Authenticity demands that a mobile agent needs
to be able to prove the claim that they make during the communication. This
means that the mobile agent needs to be able to identify itself to others to allow
agencies to determine whether it can be trusted. Furthermore, the agency needs
to prove the authenticity of itself so that the agent can be sure whether it is on
the correct agency.
Confidentiality implies restrictions on system access and disclosure [1]. This de-
mands that information cannot be allowed unauthorized access between com-
munication partners. Further, this covers two concepts: data confidentiality and
privacy. The concept of data confidentiality is to protect the private information
not be disclosed to unauthorized parties.
4Accountability means the partners during any action need to be responsible and
cannot deny responsibility later on. Accountability generates the requirement
for actions of an party to be able traced in the system [1]. The reason is that a
secure system must enable to trace the responsible party. A secure system must
keep records of their activities to permit later analysis or to help the transaction
disputes [1].
Availability demands that the authorized partner can access to resources reliable
and rapidly ways. The goal of availability is to ensure that the service cannot
be unauthorized prohibit. The system and service cannot deny to authorized
users. For example, a malicious host can reject to execute a mobile agent. On
the other hand, the malicious agency could deny letting the mobile agent to
migrate to different platforms.
Anonymity means that users do not have to identify themselves. However, anonymity
is contrast to authenticity. There are some solutions for anonymity.
2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography is concerns a collection of a variety of tools and security mecha-
nisms, it also includes analyzing protocols to improve the secure communication in
the network. Cryptography solves various needs in information security such as data
confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation [2].
2.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptosystem
Symmetric key cryptosystem is a scheme using the same key for both encryption
and decryption the text.
EKey(P ) = C
and,
DKey(C) = P
5where EKey is the encryption using key Key to encrypt the plaintext P . Further, DKey
is the decryption using key Key to decrypt the ciphertext C. Common symmetric key
schemes are the data encryption standard (DES) and advanced encryption standard
(AES).
Data Encryption Standard (DES) DES is a symmetric key cryptosystem [3].
DES can encrypts a length of 64 bits plaintext P by using length of 56 bits
key Key to compute a length of 64 bits ciphertext C. DES uses a Feistel-like
encryption structure.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES is a iterated cipher which is based
on permutation and substitution [4]. AES cipher can three different sizes of
key which is 128, 192, or 256 bits. There are four basic operations in an AES
round.
1. ByteSub (BS): This is a non-linear layer for resistance to differential and
linear cryptanalysis attacks.
2. ShiftRow (SR):This is a linear mixing layer cause diffusion of the bits over
multiple rounds.
3. MixColumn (MC): This is the layer that similar to shiftrow SR.
4. AddRoundKey (ARK): The round key is XORed with the result of all the
layers.
DES is no longer considered secure due to its short key size, however triple DES
(TDES) is still secure.
2.2.2 Public Key Cryptosystem
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric key cryptosystems. A Public
key cryptosystem uses two separate keys, one is a public key and the other one is the
secret key. The secret key is used to decrypt ciphertext or to create a digital signature.
The public key is used to encrypt plaintext or to verify digital signature [5].
62.2.3 Key Exchange
The goal of a key exchange is to generate a common key between two partici-
pants by using a public channel. The two participants can use the common key in
the cryptosystem. There are several methods that can be used to achieve a key ex-
change, two common key exchanges are public key encryption and Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [6].
2.2.4 EL Gamal Encryption
EL Gamal encryption is a public key encryption cryptosystem [6]. The security
of EL Gamal encryption security is related to the difficulty of computing discrete
logarithm. In this setting p is a large prime and α a primitive element of Zp. Let a
denote the secret key, the corresponding public key β is computed as β ≡ αa( mod p).
Made the information (p, α, β) public(see Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 1 El-Gamal Encryption
1: Alice who wishes to send a message to Bob downloads Bob’s publick key(p, α, β)
2: Alice chooses a random integer k and computes r ≡ αk(modp)
3: Alice computes t ≡ βk(mod p)
4: Alice sends (r, t) to Bob
Algorithm 2 El-Gamal Decryption
1: Bob computes tr−a ≡ m(mod p)
2: Bob returns (m)
2.2.5 Hash value
A hash function is a one-way function [7]. It is a function which takes as an input
a message of any size and computes a fixed length output. The output is called a
7digest or hash. The function is one way function computed over the message, easy
to compute and computationally hard to invert. Hash function h(·) maps the any
arbitrary size of byte to a fixed size sequence. There is an important feature of hash
function h(·) which is it is hard to find the original value when only the hash value is
known. In addition, it is also to find a different value that will be collision after the
hash value. In other words, if two hash values are the same that is the two original
values are the same value. Some other properties a hash function should satisfy:
Collision Resistance: It is computationally hard to find two inputs a, b where a 6= b
and h(a) = h(b).
One way function: Given the hash h(x) is hard to find the input x.
Ease of Computation Given x it is easy to compute h(x).
2.2.6 Hash Chaining
A hash chaining protocol has seven security properties: confidentiality, nonrepudi-
ation, strong forward integrity, publicly verifiable chain, insertion resilience, deletion
resilience, and truncation resilience [8]. Using data collection by hash chaining is one
of the ways to prevent malicious hosts change the information that a visiting agent
has already collected from other hosts. The author is using the protocol that the user,
denoted by S0, sends out one mobile agent to n different hosts S1· · ·Sn. the protocol
is used to protect the information that the agents collected in previous hosts. We
discuss this in greater detail in Section 4.1.1.
2.2.7 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is used for authentication, integrity, and non-reputation [2]. A
digital signature binds the data and the secret key. There are two common signature
schemes, RSA signatures and EL-Gamal signatures [9], [10]. Also, there is a hash
and signing method to instead of the RSA signatures and EL-Gamal signature. Here
8we are using the hash and signing in our later protocol. The hash function h(·) is
made public. Using the (M, sign(h(M))) and the public keys are inputs to the digital
signature verification algorithm (see Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 3 Hashing and Signing
1: Hash the message M , h(M)
2: Calculates the signed message sig(h(M))
3: Uses sig(h(M)) as the signature of the message M
4: Returns (M, sign(h(M)))
Algorithm 4 Verifcation of
1: Given (M ′, sign(h(M)))
2: Hash the message M ′, h(M ′)
3: Calculate Verify( sig(h(M), public key)
4: if Verify( sig(h(M), public key) equals h(M ′) then
5: Return true
6: else
7: Return false
2.2.8 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a method to share out the secret key in such a way that only
authorized subsets can reconstruct the key [11,12]. Let t, n be positive integers with
t ≤ n. Then a (t, n) threshold sharing scheme scheme is a method that is used to
share a secret key K among a set of n parties, such that any subset of t or more
parties can reconstruct the secret key K, but any subset t− 1 or less parties cannot
9determine any information concerning the secret key K. This can be achieved by
using Shamir Secret Sharing:
f(x) = K +
t−1∑
j=1
ajx
j mod p. (2.1)
For each i (i = 1, ..., n) let xi be distinct public nonzero values. Then participant Pi
receives the share f(xi) mod p. Observe that substituting x = 0 in equation (2.1),
f(x) = K.
Thus if Pi1 , ..., Pit wish to reconstruct the secret then,
K =
t∑
j=1
f(xij)
t∏
w=1
w 6=j
.
Fig. 2.1.: Shamir Threshold Sharing Scheme
2.2.9 (t, n) Threshold Signature
Threshold signature scheme is used sharing mechanism to protect the signing
key [13]. Here any subset of t or more parties can construct a signore to some message
m and any subset of t− 1 or less cannot construct a signature.
10
The El-Gamal Threshold signature scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme
that can be used to construct El-Gamal signatures [14].
Initialization: see Algorithm 5
Algorithm 5 Initialization of (t, n) El Gamal threshold signature
1: TTP choose a hash function h
2: TTP choose a secure elliptic curve E so that it has a subgroup of order q where
q is suitably large
3: User U decides the polynomial f(x) of degree at most (t− 1) with public coordi-
nates associated with each agents Ai
4: The group of secret key k = f(0)
5: The group of public key Y = kG mod p
6: For each i, the share si is calculated as si = ui + f(xi) where ui ∈R Zq \ 0, and
the xi are public (i = 1, 2, ..., n) . si and Ui are placed in the agent Ai’s data
structure. All values x1, . . . , xn are also placed on the data structure.
7: User U calculates the public elements Yi and Zi where Yi = siG mod p and
Zi = uiG mod p these are associated with mobile agent Ai ∈ A. The points
Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn are placed in agent Ai’s data structure
8: The parameters (h, q,G, Y ) together with {(Yi, Zi)|Ai ∈ A}
Signing: see Algorithm 6 Partial Signature Generation of (t, n) ElGamal threshold
signature.
Verification: see Algorithm 7 Verification (t, n) ElGamal threshold signature.
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Algorithm 6 Partial Signature Generation of (t, n) ElGamal threshold signature
1: For each i, agent Ai generates a secret key ki ≤ q − 1 . Now compute Ri =
kiG mod p. The host of agent Ai posts Ri on BB
2: agent Ai downloads R1, ..., Rn from BB
3: Once active agent subset B ⊂ A is known, each agent Ai ∈ B computes R and e,
where R =
∑
Ai∈B Ri and e ≡ h( best offer, R) mod q
4: Agents Ai generates their partial signature ci by (si, ki) Note ci ≡
si
∏
AAi∈B;j 6=i
−xj
xi − xj + kie mod q
5: Agent Ai sends (offer, ci) on the BB.
6: Agent Ai downloads all partial signatures (offer, cj) from B that are on the
bulletin board BB and verify the partial signatures by checking ciG
7: ciG ≡
∏
Aj∈B;j 6=i
−xj
xi − xj Yi + eRi
8: If All partial signature are congruence
9: Computes σ =
∑
Ai∈B ci mod q
10: The (B, R, σ) is the signature of best offer
Algorithm 7 Verification (t, n) ElGamal threshold signature
T =
∑
Ai∈B
∏
Aj∈B
j 6=i
−xj
xi − xjZi
Check σG
?≡ Y + T + eR where e ≡ h( best offer, R) mod q
2.2.10 Environmental Key Encryption
The goal of environmental key encryption is to let the host remain clueless about
the message unless the host possesses a specific environmental item [8]. Environmen-
tal key encryption can allow the host determine the item if it has the key otherwise
making the host clueless about the item. In this way, this could possibly protect the
private code and data of mobile agent from being analyses by the hosts. Environmen-
tal key encryption use a cipher item and a method to search environment for the data
needed to generate the key decryption. The host can generate the key to decipher
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Fig. 2.2.: Threshold Signature Distribution Phase
Fig. 2.3.: Threshold Signature Construction Phase
the item when the cipher item is found. Without this key, the host cannot know the
item that the user is searching for. The general way is to give the mobile agent the
hash value of the item or information and compare this hash value to all the hashes
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values of items the host possesses. If they match, the hash value is used as a key to
decrypt the rest of the information to be process. The goal here is as follows:
KEY = h(ITEM)
X = h(h(ITEM))
If h(h(ITEM)) = X then reveal the key to the host and decrypt rest of the code of
mobile agent.
Algorithm 8 Environmental Key Encryption
1: Message M is encrypted by ITEM
2: Encrypt the ITEM by hash function h(·),
KEY = h(ITEM)
3: Encrypt the KEY by second hash,
X = h(h(ITEM))
4: Return X
Algorithm 9 Environmental Key Decryption
1: Computes Y = h(h(PRODUCT ))
2: if Y == X then
3: if PRODUCT==ITEM then
4: Decrypt the message M by PRODUCT
2.3 Pairing Based Cryptography
Let G be an additive ableian group of prime order q and G1 to a multiplicative
group of order q. Pairing based cryptography [15] is a cryptographic tool that de-
scribes a mapping e which maps elements from G×G to a multiplicative group G1,
e : G×G→ G1, that satisfies the following properties:
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Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
Non-degeneracy: e(P,Q) 6= 1
Computability: There exist an efficient algorithm that can compute e(P,Q) for all
P,Q ∈ G
2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Here one constructs an elliptic curve E such that number of points on E, repre-
sented by #E has a large prime divisor q. Then there is a natural addition on E, so
that E is an additive abelian group. Thus there will be a subgroup of E of order q.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [6] is where one construct cryptographic primi-
tives over the elliptic curve E. Many of the cryptographic primitives that are based
on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm , can be redefined over an elliptic curve.
One of the ECC advantages is that it can use a smaller key size to make the same
level of security compared to the classical cryptosystems. Curve E is chosen so that
it has a subgroup of large prime order q.
Table 2.1.: Key Sizes for Encryption Algorithms in bits [16]
Year Symmetric Factoring Discrete Discrete Elliptic Hash
(modulus) Log Key Log Group Curve
2033 96 2698 169 2698 181 191
2034 96 2768 171 2768 182 192
2035 97 2840 172 2840 184 194
2036 98 2912 173 2912 185 195
2037 99 2986 175 2986 186 197
2.4.1 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic
One of the ECC advantages is that it can use a smaller key size to make the same
level of security compared to the classical cryptosystems. Curve E is chosen so that
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it has a subgroup of large prime order q. An Elliptic curve E can be defined over a
prime field Fp over Zp. Then all points (x, y) that satisfy:
y = x3 + ax+ b
where a, b ∈ Fp, together with the special point O, which is called the point of infinity,
belong to E. As mentioned early there is a natural addition on E.
Negative of a point: P = (xP , yP ) −P = (xP ,−yP )
Doubling a point: Doubling one point P , where P = (x, y). R = 2P = (x′, y′)
s = 3(x)
2+a
2y
where y 6= 0.
x′ = s2 − 2x and
y′ = −y + s(x− x′)
Adding two distinct points P and Q: Adding two points P and Q, where P =
(xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ)R = P +Q = (xR, yR).
s =
yP−yQ
xP−xQ
xR = s
2 − xP − xQ and
yR = −yP + s(xP − xR)
where s is the slope of the line through P,Q.
Now, we discuss the computing of a scalar multiple, kP where k is an integer with
0 < k < q and P is a point on ECC(see Algorithm 10).
2.4.2 Elliptic Curve El-Gamal
Suppose G is a generator of the prime subgroup of E.Let y + kG then k is the
secret key and Y is a public key.
Now suppose M is a plaintext message and encrypted M by adding to kY where
Y is a public key and k is a random scalar. Here C1 and C2 are denote as a ciphertext
(see Algorithm 11 and Algorithm 12) [6].
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Algorithm 10 Scalar Multiple kP in ECC
1: Q← O
2: for i from n− 1 down to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q
4: if ki = 1 then
5: Q← Q+ P
6: Returns Q
Algorithm 11 Elliptic Curve El-Gamal Encryption
1: Selects private key x and computes Y = xG
2: Encrypt M where M belongs to the prime subgroup of E
3: Selects k and Computes R = kG
4: The ciphertext is (C1, C2) = (kG,M + kY )
5: Returns (C1, C2)
Algorithm 12 Elliptic Curve El-Gamal Decryption
1: Receives the ciphertext (C1, C2)
2: Computes −xC1 + C2 = M by using her secret key
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3. BACKGROUND OF MOBILE AGENT
3.1 Mobile Agent
Mobile agents are software entities which can act autonomously like a user. Mobile
agents can migrate to different platforms in order to find out the specific items or ser-
vices that are requested by the user. The mobile agents can do browsing, comparing,
and negotiating for the user during the searching. Users do not need to monitor the
workstation to wait for the result or supervise the mobile agents until mobile agents
get the job done. Mobile agents can save bandwidth, avoid network traffic, and react
to the dynamic environment fast.
3.1.1 Basic Terminology
Agent migration refers to transferring a mobile agent from one host to another. A
mobile agent is a software program and be executed by systems. The user who starts
the agent is called agent’s owner. Agent’s codes will be held by the host. The host
executes the agent’s code and provides some functionality for agent communication,
security and migration. The host is reachable by URL.
3.1.2 The Structure of Mobile Agent
Mobile agent consists of two components: code and data. The code contains the
mobile agent instructions serve as the logic of mobile agent. Data can be divided into
two parts which are static data and dynamic data. Static data is restricted to be
changed, on the other hand, dynamic data is allowed to be changed.
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Static Data The static part is unchangeable during the migration. Public static
data is for all the visited hosts to read such as the name of the flight. Private static
data is only read by the agent itself.
Dynamic Data The dynamic part of data is modifiable during the migration.
One example of dynamic data is the list of visited hosts with the price information.
3.2 Mobile Agent Migration
The Migration Framework is (see Figure 3.1) [7]:
1. Initialize agent. The user starts with the special command, migration command,
and announce the intention to migrate to another host.
2. Capture data and state. Agents date and state information is written to agent.
3. Transfer the agent. Transfer the agent to the receiver host.
4. Receive the agent. The receiver host checks if the agent can be accepted. The
receiver host verifies the information about the user and the sender host and
rejects the agent which is unknown or not trusted.
5. Execute the agent. The variables and execution state are restored from the
agent.
6. Start agent execution.
3.3 Mobile Agent Communication
Mobile agents need to work together to solve a single task when the user sends
out more than one mobile agents. In this case, it is important to have a technique
to solve the problem of agent coordination and communication. For example, mobile
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Fig. 3.1.: Migration Scheme
agents need to synchronize their results, to exchange the data that they collected
separately.
There are two types of communication techniques [7]: message passing and in-
formation space. We use the later one. We focus the discussion on the problem of
communication, in particular, how frequently do migrating mobile agents migrating
communicate to each other in a reliable way.
Information Space Information space solves the communication problem between
the agents. There is no need for writer agents and reader agents to synchro-
nize to communicate. The goal is to write and read the information from the
information space. Mobile agents need to register their requirements with the
information space if they want to make sure that they get notified when new
information is published on the information space.
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Blackboard System All the information on blackboard is stored under an identifier.
This allow the reader agents to know which agent wrote the information on the
blackboard. Blackboard system is good for collaborating softwares to exchange
information among agents. All the agents must have some common knowledge
so that they can share the information on the blackboard.
3.4 Advantages of a Mobile Agent
There are some advantages of mobile agent such as delegation of tasks, asyn-
chronous processing, adaptable service interfaces, and code shipping versus data ship-
ping [7].
3.4.1 Delegation of Task
A mobile agent represent the user to delegate tasks. Instead of using computer
systems as interactive tools that only work under direct control by users, we are using
mobile agents that can take care of the task on their own. As a result, the user can
spend time and attention to other things. Mobile agents are a good way to deal
with the information. For example, Alice is going to arrange a business trip where
she needs to book a flight ticket and a hotel. She dispatches a mobile agent to deal
with the bookings so that she can have more time to arrange the meeting with her
business partners. After setting up the mobile agent, she can go oﬄine and let the
mobile agent find the best offer with the information regarding flights and hotel then
help her to purchase the products.
3.4.2 Asynchronous Processing
Once mobile agents have been initialized and set up for a task, they leave the
user’s computer system and migrate through the Internet. Only the first migration
requires a network connection. This is also a feature that allows the user to operate
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with their portable devices. The user can start the mobile agents from mobile devices
such as personal digital assistant and notebook computer which have the feature of
mobility and portability for mobile user to connect to the network. However, mo-
bile devices offer limited bandwidth, limited transmission speed, higher cost, lower
computing power, and volatile network links. Because mobile agents become inde-
pendent of the process after the user sent out the mobile agent, it will be more stable
than client-server-based applications. Mobile agents can operate asynchronously and
autonomously without the user.
3.4.3 Adaptable Server Interface
In a distributed system application service interfaces are usually like a collection
of functions [7]. Most of the interface functions are more or less primitive. On the
other hand, mobile agents can simulate a highly specialized interface for the user
while talking to each host in its own language to allow hosts to become simpler and
more generalized. Mobile agents can execute environment and react autonomously
to changes. Also, they have the ability to distribute themselves among the hosts and
collect information during the migration.
3.4.4 Code shipping versus Data shipping
A mobile agent stands in close relationship to adaptable service interfaces which
offer only primitive functions to access databases. Instead of transferring data to the
user, where it will be executed, filtered, and cause a new request, this code can be
transferred to the location of the data by mobile agent. Only the relevant data is sent
back to the user, which reduces network traffic and save time because of the filtering.
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3.5 Disadvantages of a Mobile Agent
The main problem with mobile agent is security such as delegation of tasks, asyn-
chronous processing, TTP issues, price discrimination, profiling, unauthorized access,
and unauthorized dissemination.
3.5.1 Delegation of Tasks
Mobile agents are autonomous and migrate without direct control by the user,
it is hard to govern mobile agents, in terms of what is allowed or not allowed to do
during the process. There is an important issue of delegation of authentication that
the mobile agent carries proofs of its authorizations which are private information
and knowledge such as passwords.
3.5.2 Asynchronous Processing
Mobile agents can operate asynchronously and autonomously without the user
which means the host gains full control over the agents which is possible that the
code of mobile agent could be modified. For example, the mobile agent could be
modified to attack on other hosts. In addition, the collected data from previous hosts
or dynamic information could also be read, copy, or delete the information from the
current host.
3.5.3 TTP Issues
It is difficult to disseminate mobile agent execution environments to large numbers
of TTP services. In addition, TTP providers in the face of security concerns. Also,
there is a commercial issue whether the TTP supports the computational load of
mobile agent and to permit users ability to customize server behavior [3].
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3.5.4 Price Discrimination
Host could charge different price for the same product based on the client profile.
For example, if the host knows that some product is of great interest to one sort
of clients they may charge more money for this product than other clients. Take
Amazon for example, in 2000, Amazon started to charge customers different prices
for same DVD title. Companies usually divide their potential customers into similar
groups based on customer’s characteristic.
3.5.5 Profiling
Profiling is the process of discovering patterns in data that can be used to identify a
user and application of correlated data. For example, the hosts can obtain information
of the user and modify their offers regarding the preference of the user in e-commerce
environment.
3.5.6 Unauthorized Access
The attacker could attack the machine where stores sensitive information about
principles without consent if the machine without appropriate protection. For in-
stance, the malicious host can be listening to transferred information over the network
such as emails, files, messages and gather the information flowing in the network.
3.5.7 Unauthorized Dissemination
Malicious hosts can transfer the collected information to other parties without
consent of the user of this information. For example, a mobile agent A collects the
information that it receives about another mobile agent B. Mobile agent A can
transfer information about mobile agent B to another mobile agent C.
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3.6 Possible Applications of Mobile Agent
Mobile agent build distributed application more efficiently. We can look at dif-
ference application to understand that mobile agent enable a new level of networked
software.
3.6.1 Electronic Commerce
Mobile agent support for automation and higher coverage of information from
different resources. The customer only need to state what he or she wants and no
need to manually to implement how this is done. Mobile agent offer delegation and
asynchronous task execution to process the requirement for the user without any
interaction.
3.6.2 Information Retrieval
Instead of moving large amounts of data to a single point where it is searched,
information retrieval moves the data searching code to the data. This is a new way
for the search engine, Web pages will analyzed locally by the mobile agent that was
sent to the Web Server. Mobile agents will be able to unify that interface from the
client’s perspective and offer a higher and well-adapted level of functionality. The
main idea is to move code close to a large database instead of transferring lots of data
to a client [7].
3.6.3 Network Management
Network management involves collecting and analyzing data from the devices to
monitor and control the devices [17]. Mobile agents solve the problems of perfor-
mance management such as network delay and information bottleneck by its ability
of migrating from node to node. Mobile agents can analyze the node locally instead
of analyzing all the collected data from the nodes in the management station.
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4. RELATED WORK
We now discuss some related work concerning the use of mobile agent in e-commerce
systems. In our work, our goal is to enable the mobile agents to purchase the best
offer of the targeted item. Achieving this while maintaining privacy.
We will first discuss the work of Singelee [8]. Later, we will discuss a protocol
constructed by Jalal [18]. This latter protocol inspired much of our work.
4.1 Secure E-commerce using Mobile Agents on Untrusted Hosts
Here we discuss some work concerning secure and efficient mobile agent application
in e-commerce.
4.1.1 Hash Chaining
Secure data collection by using hash chaining [8] is one way to prevent malicious
hosts from changing the information that an agent has already collected from other
hosts. Here the user, denoted by S0, sends out one mobile agent to n different
hosts, denoted by (S1· · ·Sn). To protect the information that the agent collects from
previous hosts as it migrates, one can use the hash chaining protocol protocol [8].
There are several steps: hash chaining, encapsulating the offer and the transmission
protocol.
The user S0 of the mobile agent initializes the “first offer” o0 by assigning at the
initial information such as the identity of the mobile agent. Using the hash function
h(·) to compute the initial chaining relation h0 with the initial offer o0 and the identity
of the first host S1. The user S0 selects a random number r0 and encrypts the random
number r0 and the public key of the user (S0). Next, the user S0 constructs the
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encapsulated offer O0 by signing the encryption and the chaining relation h0, see
Equation 4.1. Then they send encapsulated offer O0 to the first host S1. All the
hosts Si, for i = 1,· · · , n, performs nearly the same steps. First, the host Si calculates
the chaining relation hi using the encapsulated offer Oi−1, see Equation 4.2, which
they received from the previous host Si−1 and the identity of the next host Si+1. Next,
the host will select a random number ri and use this random number ri to encrypt
the offer oi with the public key of the user S0. Finally, the host Si constructs the
encapsulated offer Oi by signing the encrypted(oi, ri), the chaining relation hi, and
all the encapsulated offers O1· · ·Oi−1 from the previous hosts sent to the next host
Si+1. At the conclusion, the last host Sn will sent the encryption(on, rn), chaining
relation hn, and all the encapsulated offers O1· · ·On−1 from the previous hosts sent
to the user S0, i.e. Sn+1 = S0.
Chaining Relation: Here oi represents the of host Si. In the case i = 0, o0 = AID .
h0 = h(o0, S1) (4.1)
hi = h(Oi−1, Si+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (4.2)
Table 4.1.: Symbols used in Singelee’s hash chaining
S0 = Sn+1 Identity of the user
Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Identity of host i
o0 Initial information(e.g. identity of the agent AID)
oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Offer from host i
Oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Encrypted offer from host i Hi
O0, O1, O2,· · · , On Chain of encapsulated offers
Encapsulated Offer: In this case, host Si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, encapsulates its offer by:
Oi = SIGi(ENC0(ri, oi)hi).
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Table 4.2.: Cryptographic notation used in Singelee’s hash chaining
ri Random number generated by host Si
ENC0(m) Message m encrypted with the public key of user S0
SIGi(m) Message m digitally signed by host Si
H(m) Hash value calculated on message m
Si → Si+1 : m Message m is sent from host Si to host Si+1
Transmission Protocol: Here hiost Si transmits to host Si+1.
Si → Si+1 : {ok, Ok|0 ≤ k ≤ i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ n}
4.2 Secure Web Transaction with Anonymous Mobile Agent Protocol
Jalal’s protocol [18], the e-commerce systems consists of users U , servers S, and a
trusted third party TTP . The mobile agent that is prepared by the user U is denoted
by A.
4.2.1 Setup
The TTP generates a secure elliptic curve E, which a subgroup G1 of order p,
where p is suitably large prime. The TTP then computes a generator G for the
subgroup of E of order q where q is prime. Let G2 denotes a multiplicative group of
order q. We assume there is a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2. Further, there is secure
cryptographic hash function denoted by h(·). The TTP publishes E,G1,G2, G, and
h.
Next the TTP selects a random number s ∈R Z∗q then publishes sG. Each user
U generates a private key kU and public key YU = kUG to use in a digital signature
scheme for authentication in the system. The TTP also generates a private key kTTP
and a public key YTTP = kTTPG. We denote is H0 = H(Rx(YTTP )||Ry(YTTP )) where
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Rx(YTTP ) is the x coordinate of YTTP and the Ry(YTTP ) is the y coordinate of YTTP
and || is the concatenation. Each user U has an identity IDU which is bounded to
their public key YU by a trusted party Certificate Authority CA.
4.2.2 Registering a User
The user U registers with TTP then receives secret parameters γU and AU from
the TTP , where γU and AU are computed as described in Algorithm 13. The TTP
records the public key YU , identity IDU , and the secret parameters:γU and AU of the
user C into the database (see Algorithm 13).
Algorithm 13 The TTP registration of user U [8]
1: The TTP performs the following operations.
2: Selects random ωU ∈R Z∗q
3: Computes AU = ωUG− YU
4: Computes γU = H0ωU +Rx(AU)kTTP mod q
5: Stores γU , AU , YU , ωU , and IDU in TTP database
6: Returns AU and γU to user U
4.2.3 User releases Mobile Agents
The user U prepares the agent’s data structure (see Table 4.3) and incorporates
the requirements of its intended “targeted item” into the instruction set of the data
structure of mobile agent. The user then dispatches the mobile agent. The mobile
agent will work autonomously to locate the targeted item and return the best offer
for that item that as required (see Algorithm 14).
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Table 4.3.: General Mobile Agent Data Structure
Session Number User’s Request
Routing Table
Time Stamp
Instruction Set
Static Data
Dynamic Data
Virtual Certificate Vcert
Algorithm 14 User U Prepares Mobile Agent [8]
The user performs the following operations.
1: Prepares request and routing table of the mobile agent
2: Embeds the code and instruction on the mobile agent
3: Uploads the static data on the mobile agent
4: Prepares the virtual certificate
5: Selects ψ ∈R Z∗q
6: Computes elliptic curve point T = ψG
7: Selects t ∈R Z∗q and computes tG
8: Computes z = tRx(AC) mod q and computes zG
9: Computes B = t(AC + T )
10: Computes λ = γCt+ (ψt− kCt+ xH(M))H0 mod q
11: Computes tx and tL = txG
12: Returns the Vcert = (zG, tG,B, λ, L, tx, tL)
4.2.4 Host Authenticate and Execute Agent
When a server S receives the mobile agent, it will check if the mobile agent is
authentic or not, before it executes the instruction set on the server site. If the
mobile agent A is not authentic, the server S will reports this mobile agent to the
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TTP . Further, if the mobile agent A is authentic but the instruction set turns out to
be malicious then the TTP can trace the user U who dispatch this malicious mobile
agent. There are several steps for the host to authenticate the mobile agent. Recall
the virtual certificate parameters:zG, tG,B, λ, L, tx, and tL.
First, the server S computes λ1G and zYTTP from Equation (4.3)
λG
?
= H0(B +H(M)L) + zYTTP . (4.3)
The server S now computes tYTTP , the passed parameter tG,and the public in-
formation G, and YTTP to check the validity of the relation (see Equation (4.4), and
Equation (4.5)).
W = λG−H0(B +H(M)L). (4.4)
e(W,G)
?
= e(zG, YTTP ). (4.5)
If the Equation (4.5) return a yes then the mobile agent A is authenticated. The
server S will then execute the instruction set of mobile agent A and the request. The
server S will store the result and the output in the dynamic data structure of mobile
agent A.
4.2.5 Signature and Verification
The server S will sign its output Sbid so that no one can forge the output in
dynamic data structure. The server S signs the output SignS(m) where m =
H(H(D)||IDS||Sbid). The signature Sig = {K, r} where k ∈R Z∗q and computes K =
kG. The mobile agent also computes r = H(H(m)||H(D)||H(Vcert,Ck+Rx(K)tx mod
q)) so that the Sbid and the authentication parameters Vcert,U have been bound into
a signature (see Algorithm 15).
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Algorithm 15 Signature Verification [8]
1: INPUT: m = H(IDS, Sbid), data structure D, and Vcert,U
2: if SignS(m) is not a valid signature then
3: Return FALSE
4: if The routing table is listed and IDS /∈ routingtable then
5: Return FALSE
6: if e(tL,G) 6= e(L, tG) then
7: Return FALSE
8: Computes rG
9: if rG 6= H(H(m)||H(D)||H(Vcert,C))K +Rx(K)tL then
10: Return FALSE
11: Return TRUE
4.2.6 Tracing and Revoking Malicious Users
If TTP receives complains about mobile agent A from server S. The servers
reports to the TTP that they have received an authenticated agent which is malicious.
The TTP traces the malicious user U by using session parameter and revokes the user
U(see Algorithm 16).
Algorithm 16 Tracing and Revoking Malicious Users [8]
1: Server S complains to TTP about malicious mobile agents and sends the session
parameters of the mobile agent.
2: TTP checks its database for an A that satisfies Rx(AU)tG = zG
3: TTP publishes the corresponding AU in the network
4: Each server S adds the published AU to its revocation list, so that this malicious
user is not authenticated anymore.
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5. SECURITY DESIGN OF MOBILE AGENT
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the three basic components of security.
There are a number of security services from these three compoenets that impact our
work, they include: authentication, access control, nonrepudiation, tracibility, and
revocation and accountability [18].
Confidentiality: Confidentiality concerns that private and sensitive information
should not be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. We need to protect: the
data between mobile agent to host, the data between host to mobile agent, and
the data between blackboard to host. It is possible that the user data can be
attacked by a malicious host. For example, when the host is executing a mobile
agent which carries some private information about the user could be hack by
malicious host. On the other hand, the host could be attacked by the agent with
malicious code which is sent by the user, so that the user can attain sensitive
documentation from the host. The host is the one that has responsibility to
send the mobile agent to the blackboard. Thus the data and information on
the blackboard could be manipulated by the host.
Integrity: Integrity includes data integrity, and system integrity [19]. By integrity
we are concerned with protecting data and information so that it is not modified,
nor is data inserted, deleted, or replayed by an unauthorized entity during
the migration from host to host as well as host to blackboard. Consider the
the dynamic data section of the mobile agent (see Section 3.1.2). A possible
integrity scenario: a current host could modify the previous data to make the
current host’s offer the best in comparison to previous host. In addition, the
information on the blackboard could be changed only in authorized manner. As
the result the host is the party that has responsibility to send the mobile agent
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to the blackboard. Thus, the data and information on the blackboard should
only be modified by the last host who is authorized to sent mobile agent to the
blackboard.
Authentication: The authentication should provide a proof of an authenticated
identity and verify the authentication information in the system. Peer entity
authentication and data-origin authentication [1] are needed to provide the con-
nection and the assurance of the data. Two entities are consider as peers, for
example mobile agent to host, host to mobile agent, and host to blackboard. A
mobile agent will need to prove that it is honest so that the host can trust it
and execute it. On the other hand, the host needs to prove that it is an honest
host so that it has the right to write the offer in the dynamic part of mobile
agent. The mobile agent needs to prove that it has the right to write on the
blackboard and the host needs to prove that it is authorized to access into the
blackboard.
Access Control: The goal of an access control feature is to prevent the unautho-
rized access of resource under some conditions. In practice, an access control
feature needs three main elements fulfilled: authentication, authorization, and
audit [19]. In our protocol, we need to consider the access control between the
agent and host, between host and agent, between host and blackboard, and
between agent and blackboard. For example, it is possible that a host could be
attacked by a malicious mobile agent which carries malicious operation such as
unauthorized data access on local system. The audit (i.e. log of transaction) is
needed, auditing is outside the scope of this thesis.
Nonrepudiation: Nonrepudiation prevents either sender or receiver from denying
a transmitted message [1]. To overcome this, the receiver can prove that the
sender sent the mobile agent and when the mobile agent is sent, vice versa, the
sender can prove that the receiver received the mobile agent when the mobile
agent is received.
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Traceable: Tractability is service, the user or host finds out malicious entities if
so then they should report it to TTP and the TTP is able to determine the
identity of the user. For example, the host reports to TTP about the malicious
mobile agent. It must be possible to trace the event and the party to who was
malicious.
Revocation and Accountability: Revocation is a service that if the user or host
is verified to be malicious and report to TTP , the TTP will then revoke these
parties and their access to this ecommerce system.
Availability: The availability needs to ensure that the system exists for usage. A
system is available if it it is able to provide the service requested. For example,
the current host could restrict the agents and even made its offer be the best
in the comparison. Availability depends on access control service and other
security service [1]. The use of a event logs and courts can help redeem. This
service is outside the scope of this thesis.
We now discuss some special services that pertain to our work.
Privacy of Purchasing: The goal of privacy of purchasing is that the targeted item
(what to buy), what the mobile agent is looking for, should be private only to
those that need to know. We should hide this information from hosts that
do not have the targeted item. We can hide the search item that the user is
searching for when it arrive at a host. Only if the host possess the item should
they know about the item. If the host does have the item then it will know
what target item the user is searching for, otherwise it has no idea about the
item but only know that it does not provide the item.
35
6. MOBILE AGENTS IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Here we develop a secure e-commerce protocol. The security tools that we utilize
include elliptic curve cryptography, paring based cryptography and secret sharing.
The structure of our mobile agent system will have three types of parties and the
bulletin board. The parties include: trusted third party TTP , users U , and hosts H
(see Figure 6.1).
Trusted Third Party (TTP ): The trusted third party TTP controls the access to
the e-commerce system. The users need to register with TTP first if they want
to join the system.
User (U): The user U is the party that utilizes the e-commerce system to make
purchase. They will constructs and release mobile agents.
Host (H): The host H is the party in network that the mobile agent visits. They
execute the instructions of mobile agent.
Bulletin Board (BB): The bulletin board BB provides a site for mobile agents to
exchange information by granting to read and write access to it.
Here the user will construct several mobile agents. In order to simplify this part of
the protocol, we will first limit our discussion to the construction of a single mobile
agent. Of course a single mobile agent will not be able to “decide” the final purchase.
The decision aspect of our protocol will be discussed in Section 6.5
6.1 Motivation
Mobile agent A registers with TTP to receive security parameters for authentica-
tion between the mobile agents and the hosts.
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Fig. 6.1.: Model for our scheme
Setup: The TTP generates parameters for each member in that system. Each mem-
ber generates a pair of private and public keys in the system.
Registration: Each user U who wants to participate in the system needs to register
with the TTP . The TTP sends the secret parameters to the user.
User Access a System in the Network: The user U generates the virtual certi-
fication parameters to access a system in the network.
Server Authenticates User: A user U who wants to access a system in the network
needs to be authenticated by the host H. The host H will verify the virtual
certification parameters’ authenticity before it executes the mobile agent A.
Tracing and Revocation: The host H makes a complaint about the user U to
TTP if it determines the mobile agent A is malicious. The host H reports the
session parameters of the malicious mobile agent A to TTP . Then the TTP
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will trace the user U by using the session parameters that provided by the host
H and revokes and restricts the user U from using any system in the network
in the future.
6.2 General Setup
We assume there is a secure elliptic curve E generated for all to use (for example
one of the NIST recommended elliptic curves for federal government [20]. Further-
more, we assume that a suitably large prime q divides the #E (the number of points
on the elliptic curve E) and that base point G is a point of order q. Then E,G and
q have been published for all to use. The trusted third party TTP has the private
and public key pair denotes as xTTP and YTTP where YTTP = xTTPG. If P is a point
of the elliptic curve E then we will use Rx(P ) to denote the x-coordinate of point P
and Ry(P ) to denote the y-coordinate of point P . We will use H0 in the following:
H0 = h(Rx(YTTP )||Ry(YTTP ))
TTP also computes,
γU = H0ωU +Rx(AU)xTTP mod q. (6.1)
In addition, we assume each user U , as well as the trusted third party TTP , has
an identity IDU which is bound to their public key YU . Here xU denotes the secret
key and YU = xUG. YU and xU are the long term public and private keys of the
user U . Moreover, we assume that there is a pairing function e : G × G −→ Zq (see
Section 2.3). Lastly, we assume that a secure hash function h(·) has been selected
and publicized for all to use (see Algorithm 17) [2].
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Algorithm 17 General Setup
1: TTP publishes elliptic curve E, base point G, large prime number q, pairing
function e, and hash function h(·)
2: TTP selects private key xTTP and computes public key YTTP = xTTPG
3: TTP computes H0 = h(Rx(YTTP )||Ry(YTTP ))
4: TTP computes γU = H0ωU +Rx(AU)xTTP mod q
5: User U selects private key xU and computes public key YU = xUG
6.3 Registering with the TTP
User U must registers with the TTP to get the access to the ecommerce system
to release mobile agents and make purchases. User U sends IDU and public key YU
to the TTP (see Figure 6.2). The TTP selects ωU randomly from Zq and computes
AU = ωUG− YU . (6.2)
Fig. 6.2.: User and TTP
Then the TTP stores AU , γU , YU , IDU , ωU , and Rx(AU)
−1G in hash table which can
make the tracing be O(1)(see Table 6.1) and returns long term certification: AU and
γU to User U(see Figure 6.2). The User U can check the certification from the TTP
by computing γUG and verifying the Equation (6.3).
γUG
?
= H0(AU + YU) +Rx(AU)YTTP . (6.3)
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The γUG represents the parameter that allows user U to be authenticated by hosts
in the system. Because γUG binds the AU and YTTP , which are generated by TTP
and the long term public YU of user U .
Table 6.1.: Data Structure of TTP
AU γU YU IDU wU Rx(A)
−1G
AU1 γU1 YU1 IDU1 wU1 Rx(A1)
−1G
AU2 γU2 YU2 IDU2 wU2 Rx(A2)
−1G
AU3 γU3 YU3 IDU3 wUv Rx(A3)
−1G
...
...
...
...
...
...
Algorithm 18 Registering with the TTP
1: User U sends IDU to TTP
2: TTP selects ωU ∈R Z∗q
3: TTP computes AU = ωUG− YU
4: TTP computes γU = H0ωU +Rx(AU)xTTP mod q
5: TTP stores AU , γU , YU , IDU , ωU , and Rx(AU)
−1G in database
6: TTP sends AU and γU to user U
7: User U computes γUG
?
= H0(AU + YU) + Rx(AU)YTTP to check the certification
from the TTP
6.4 Construction and Use of Single Mobile Agent
We will first limit our discussion to the construction of a single mobile agent A.
Of course if we use a single mobile agent A then they will not be able to “decide”
and “make” the final purchase. The decision aspect of our protocol will be discussed
in Section 6.5. The users need to provide a signature to prove that they have the
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authorization to access and use the system. Each user U needs to generate virtual
certificate parameters and one-off key pair (xA, QA) [21] to prove the authorization
to access and use the system.
6.4.1 User Wishes to Use Single Mobile Agent E-commerce System
The mobile agent A (user U) needs to provide a signature to prove that they
are registered and trusted. There will be a public timer for this single mobile agent
system. The host H needs to send the mobile agent A to the bulletin board BB when
the timer reaches expiration time τ . This expiration time τ will be included in
the mobile agent data structure. The single mobile agent A is using an environmental
key generation to encrypt the targeted item I. The host H can compare the ciphertext
item with their inventory database (see discussion of environmental key). If the host
H does have the targeted item I they decrypt the rest of the instructions in mobile
agent A and execute it. Otherwise the host H needs to send the mobile agent A to
the next host. In this way, the environmental key K can decrease the risk that the
mobile agentA being attacked and protect the user U privacy. Also, if the hostH does
possess the targeted item I they can write their offer in dynamic data structure DD
of the mobile agent A using hash chaining. The concept of hash chaining prevents
previous offer modification by malicious hosts(see discussion on hash chaining).
Note: The single mobile agent will not able to purchase the item by
themselves. In section 6.5 we use multiple mobile agents and we are able
to achieve this.
6.4.2 Generating the Agent
User U will generate mobile agent A and its virtual certificate parameters Vcert as
follows (see Table 6.2). The user U generates a unique agent number AID using hash
function h(·), a random nonce and the the time of the day. They will also generate a
unique bulletin board number BBID, title of the agent, routing table of possible hosts,
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and current time stamp. They then place the instruction set, the static data, and
a location for the dynamic data DD. Lastly, they place the virtual certificate Vcert.
The parameters in the virtual certificate Vcert are generated as follows, we modify the
virtual certificate parameters Vvert that Jalal used in [18].
One-Off Key: The use of the term one-off key was introduced by Wang in [21],
which protects the identity of the user U from the host H and prove the user U
is authorized to sign without revealing the long term private key xU . The user
U selects xA ∈R Z∗q for private key and computes QA = xAG for public key of
one-off key pair. Unlike Jalal [18] we make xA secret. The user U creates the
one-off keys {xA, QA} [21]
Mobile Agent Data Structure: The single mobile agent data structure is illus-
trated in Table 6.2. The single mobile agent data structure includes M which
denote the static data that the user U put in the mobile agent A, which con-
tains the agent number AID, bulletin board number BBID, title of agent, rout-
ing time, time stamp, instruction set, and static data. Also, the single mobile
agent data structure includes dynamic data DD, virtual certificate Vcert, public
one-off key QA, and expiration time τ .
Virtual Certificate: The γU represents the ability of user U to be authenticated
by the host H. But we cannot send γU with the agent A otherwise this would
reveal the identify of the user IDU . As the result, the user U needs to hide their
sensitive information and provides enough information for host H to verify the
mobile agent A at the same time. We denote h(D) to represent the hash of
some session parameter in the mobile agent data structure with static data
M(see Equation(6.4)). The user U needs to generate a virtual certificate Vcert
by Algorithm 20.
h(D) = h(h(M)||h(gr)||h(gt)||h(gz)||h(α)||h(β)||h(YU)) (6.4)
The virtual certificate parameters Vcert includes: gr, gt, gz, α, β,QAi , and λ is
described in Algorithm 20.
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Environmental Key Generation: We are using the environmental key K to pro-
tect the privacy of data. In the real world, customers will only ask sales about
the detailed information of the targeted item I in the store if available or go to
the next shop to search for it. The goal is to hide part of the instruction set
of mobile agent so that the mobile agents do not completely know what their
behavior will be. The mobile agent A uses the targeted item I as a secret key
and generates environmental key K for hosts to compare against their database.
The environmental key K is targeted item I encrypts with hash function h(I)
and encrypt part of the code by targeted item I. The host needs to have the
product that has h(Product) = h(I), which means the Product that the host
provides is the same as targeted item I that the user U is searching for. In
this case the host H can decrypt the rest of the code by Product which is the
same as targeted item I in mobile agent A and executes it(see Figure 6.3 and
Algorithm 19).
Fig. 6.3.: Portion of Instruction Set is encrypted
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Algorithm 19 Environmental Key Generation [8]
1: User U requests the targeted item I
2: User U computes the environmental key K = h(I)
3: User U Encrypts the Instruction Set of Mobile Agent A by the targeted item I
4: Host H looks into the database of goods to checks for every Product in its
database
5: if h(Product) = K then
6: Host H decrypts the Instruction Set of Mobile Agent A by Product
Table 6.2.: Data Structure of Single Mobile Agent
Agent No. AID Bulletin Board No. BBID Title of Mobile Agent
Routing Table
Time Stamp
Environmental Key K
Instruction Set
Static Data
Expiration Time τ
Dynamic Data
Virtual Certificate Vcert={gr, gt, gz, α, β and λ }
Public One-Off Key QA
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Algorithm 20 Virtual Certificate Parameter Generation Vcert [18]
1: Input: AU , xU , one-off key{xA, QA} and static data M
2: User U computes gr = Rx(AU)
−1G
3: User U selects ψ ∈R Z∗q
4: User U computes T = ψG
5: Let t = Rx(T ) mod q
6: if t=0 then
7: Go to 2 and User U selects new ψ ∈R Z∗q
8: User U computes gt = tG
9: Let z = tRX(AU) mod q
10: User U computes gz = zG
11: Let α = AU + T
12: Let β = t(AU + T )
13: Let λ = γU t+ ψt− xU t+ xAh(D)
14: Output: Vcert = {grgt, gz, α, β, λ}.
Thus the Vcert is {gr, gt, gz, α, β, λ}. Table 6.2 illustrates the single mobile agent
data structure.
6.4.3 Host Authentication
The mobile agent A selects a starting host H1. In general the host Hi will au-
thenticate A, and execute it. Hi will check the expiration time τ in mobile agent to
see if it is time to send mobile agent A to bulletin board BB. Also, the host Hi will
check the list of malicious mobile agents by using certificated parameters Vcert. If the
expiration time τ is expired and the AID is not in the revoke list then host Hi will
send the agent A to bulletin board BB. If the expiration time τ is not expired, the
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Table 6.3.: Single Mobile Agent Data Structure
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Table 6.3.: Single Mobile Agent Data Structure
AID :d4d5db87449hdkwa BBID :ab859g “Book an flight ticket”
ar.jal.com 213.171.166.525
delta.com 198.193.60.50
aa.com 151.174.224.81
china-airlines.com 205.116.44.33
11:32 PM EST
Environmental Key K = h(“flight ticket′′)
Instruction Set
if(AID is in revoking list)
reports to TTP
if(Expiration time τ is reached)
sends agent to bulletin board BB
if(h(Product) == K){
decrypt the code in below by using “Product′′{
for m in Host which is flies from Michigan to Chicago do{
if preference(m) > 0 then
write offer in dynamic data by using hash chaining}}
sends agent to next host
Static Data
Expiration Time τ
Dynamic Data
Virtual Certificate Vcert={gr, gt, gz, α, β, λ }
gr 114 44 2 35 39 155 135 2 65 60 74 57 18 98 8 237
gt 191 14 214 13 194 213 82 165 169 178 216 34 162 178 39 102
gz 209 47 145 134 206 97 131 118 32 109 221 69 19 51 209 161
α 42 0 180 18 204 19 7 93 116 242 84 26 8 138 159 21
β 65 202 243 141 237 66 195 234 254 187 210 0 5 95 255 251
λ 158 10 245 94 250 223 124 141 91 82 45 163 192 124 237 123
Public One-Off Key QA
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Hi will execute the instruction set of agent A and send it to the next host Hi+1 (see
Algorithm 21).
The host H computes the mobile agent A by using Equation (6.5).
V = λG−H0(β + h(D)QA). (6.5)
Also, host H checks if the agent A is valid by using Equation (6.6), Equation (6.7),
and Equation (6.8) by using pairing function e.
e(V , G) ?= e(gz, YTTP ). (6.6)
Note that V = zYTTP and gz which is zG is published in the Vcert thus it is known by
the host H.
e(β,G)
?
= e(α, gt). (6.7)
Note that gt which is tG is published in the Vcert thus it is known by the host H.
e(gz, gr)
?
= e(G, gt). (6.8)
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Algorithm 21 Host Authentication
1: Checks expiration time τ
2: if Expiration time τ is expired then
3: Sends agent A to bulletin board BB
4: Checks revoking list
5: if AID is in the revoking list then
6: Stops executing agent A
7: Computes V = λG−H0(β +H(D)QA)
8: Computes e(V , G) = e(gz, YTTP )
9: if e(V , G) 6= e(gz, YTTP ) then
10: Stops executing agent A
11: Reports to TTP
12: Computes e(β,G) = e(α, gt)
13: if e(β,G) 6= e(α, gt) then
14: Stops executing agent A
15: Reports to TTP
16: Computes e(gz, gr) = e(G, gt)
17: if e(gz, gr) 6= e(G, gt) then
18: Stops executing agent A
19: Reports to TTP
20: Executes instruction set of agent A
6.4.4 Host executes Instruction Set
The host Hi searches its product database to see if it has the Product that the
user U is searching for. If the host Hi has the Product then it is allowed to execute
the instruction set of mobile agent A, i.e. it has the environmental key so it can
decrypt. If the host Hi does not have the Product then it needs to send the mobile
agent A to the next host Hi+1.
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After the host Hi executes instruction set of the mobile agent A, it computes its
host identity HID with its first 8-byte as a identification number, should sign with
its digital signature Sighost in the dynamic data part of mobile agent A and use the
hash chaining to protect the offer. The dynamic data DD of mobile agent stores
the current host identity HID, next host identity HID+1, current host public key YH ,
current host certificated certH , and current host signature SigH (see Table 6.6). The
overall execution of the host H is as following (see Algorithem 22).
Algorithm 22 Host executes Mobile Agent
1: Uses Vcert to verify the agent A
2: Checks the revoking list of malicious users
3: if Agent A belongs to the malicious user U then
4: Stops executing and reports to TTP
5: Check the Expiration Time τ
6: if τ expired then
7: Sends agent A to bulletin board BB
8: else
9: Executes instruction set of agent A
10: Checks the environmental key K in database to see if any Product matched
the environmental key K.
11: if h(Product) 6= K then
12: Sends agent A to the next host Hi+1
13: else
14: Uses the matching item Product as a decrypt key to decrypt the instruction
set and executes it
15: Signes the offer in the dynamic data DD of mobile agent
16: Sends agent A to the next host Hi+1
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6.4.5 Host writes Offer in Dynamic Data
The mobile agent A does not immediately know which host Hi provides the best
offer. In fact the mobile agent A visits many hosts and collects several offers before
the expiration time τ . If host Hi possesses product item I, it uses the environmental
key to decrypt the instruction set to write an offer in the dynamic data DD section
of the mobile agent A. However, a malicious host could try to change the offers
from previous hosts that the agent A has already visited. We will apply the hash
chaining [8] to prevent this problem and secure data collection in dynamic data DD.
Hash Chaining: We bind the previous offers, next host identity, current host iden-
tity, and current offer into one value by hashing them together. In hash chaining
the digital signature can tie the signer and the message. In this way we could
protect the price discrimination because the signature cannot be separated from
the message and the signer (see Table 6.4 and Table 6.5).
Symmetric Key (AESi): The host Hi selects an AES symmetric key AESi and
signs offer by using their signing key (see Equation (6.9).
AESi = rand(128bits)
ENCAESi(Offer). (6.9)
Encrypted Offer (ei): Using messageM digitally signed by host Hi SIGi(M) and
message M encrypted with public key of agent ENCkey(M)
ei = {ENCAESi(Offer), ENCQA(AESi),
SIG(ENCAESi(Offer)||ENCQA(AESi)||ci)}, (6.10)
0 ≤ i ≤ n
Chaining Relation (ci):
c0 = h(AID, H2)
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ci = h(ei−1, Hi+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
We compute a hash value on message M h(M)(see Figure 6.4). Host Hi can
verify the previous host Hi−1 by the chaining relation ci to see if the previous
host Hi−1 cheated.
Fig. 6.4.: Chaining Relation
Table 6.4.: Symbols used in Hash Chaining Protocol
Hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Identity of the host
QA Public one-off key of mobile agent
o0 Initial information(Identity of the agent AID)
oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Offer from host i Hi
ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Chaining relation
ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Encrypted offer from host i Hi
e1, e2, ...., en Chain of encrypted offers
Data Structure of Dynamic Data: Agent identity AID, chaining relation ci, and
encrypted offer ei (see Table 6.6).
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Table 6.5.: Cryptographic notation used in the Hash Chaining Protocol
ENCkey(Data) Data encrypted with the key ElGamal Cryptosystem
SIGi(Data) Data digitally signed by host i Hi ElGamal Signature
h(Data) Hash value calculate on Data ...
SYMi Symmetric key generates by host i Hi ...
Table 6.6.: Data Structure of Dynamic Data
Host ID Chaining Relation Encrypted Offer
HID ci ei
6.4.6 Host sends the Dynamic Data to Bulletin Board
When expiration time τ is reached, the last host sends the dynamic data DD to
the bulletin board BB.
6.4.7 User verifies the Signature and the Hash Chaining
After waiting for ∆ time, the user U can download all the offers from the bulletin
board BB and determine the best offer then purchase it.
6.5 Construction and Use of Multiple Mobile Agents
In this section we constructed multiple mobile agents (see Figure 6.5). Each of
the mobile agents is generated like a single mobile agent (Section 6.4.2) except we
use threshold signatures in this protocol and slightly change the data structure of the
mobile agent. Also, it shares many concepts with single mobile agent (Section 6.4):
the host H authentication (Section 6.4.3), the mobile agent execution (Section 6.4.4),
and the “host-offer” writing (using hash chaining) in the dynamic data DD (Section
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6.4.5). Unlike the single mobile agent, multiple mobile agents will be able to securely
determine the best offer decision and execute the final purchase in ecommerce system.
Here we will highlight the changes between a single and multiple mobile agents system.
Fig. 6.5.: Multiple Mobile Agents Scheme
6.5.1 User wishes to use Multiple Mobile Agent Ecommerce System
The user U generates a group of agents A = {A1,A2, ...,An}. Furthermore, the
user U partitions the routing table of hosts into total number n of agents disjoint
groups, where group i has nAi hosts.
n∑
i=1
nAi = # hosts.
Here the n is security parameter related to how many agents there are.
We are using the ECC El-Gamal threshold signature scheme [14] to generate dig-
ital signature to make a purchase offer. This implies they made the purchase.
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Threshold/Secret Sharing
The user U needs to decide the on the minimum number m of agents that are needed
to construct a signature. This “threshold” protects the user U from a malicious hosts
capturing agents and trying to generate a signature. Since m ≤ n, user U is using
(m,n) threshold secret sharing scheme (see Figure 6.6). The higher m offers higher
security but but also raises the number of “good agents” that are needed. The user
U first shares out the user’s signature key (a signature key is analogous to signature
for a credit card purchase) xU in n shares to each agent Ai.
Fig. 6.6.: (m,n) Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
6.5.2 Generating the Agent Ai
We modified the agent generation of the single mobile agent A. In addition, we
slightly modify the data structure of mobile agent Ai (see Table 6.7) and add a share
of user signing key (si, ui) and parameters {(Si, Zi)|Ai ∈ A}.
Mobile Agent Data Structure The multiple mobile agent data structure is simi-
lar to signal mobile agent A except the share of user’s signing key (si, ui) and
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parameters {(Sj, Zj)|Aj ∈ A} for j = 1, ..., n are added to the static data sec-
tion of the agent. We illustrate multiple mobile agent data structure in Table
6.7. The multiple mobile agent data structure includes M , which denotes the
static data that the user U places in the mobile agent Ai, which contains the
agent number Ai, bulletin board number BBi, title of agent, routing time, time
stamp, instruction set, parameters {(Sj, Zj)|Aj ∈ A}, and static data. Also,
the multiple mobile agent data structure includes the dynamic data DD, virtual
certificate Vcerti , public one-off key QAi , and share of user signing key (si, ui).
Share of User Signing Key In this protocol we are using secret sharing. The user
U wishes that a threshold with many mobile agents Ai can make the decision
and purchase the targeted product item I. The user U divides the secret key
xU into n shares so that any m of them can reconstruct the key. We are using
Algorithm 23 to initialize the partial signature. The user U calculates the
partial signature (si, ui) and parameters Sj and Zj then places partial signature
(si, ui) in data structure and places (S1 . . . Sn) and (Z1 . . . Zn) in static data
section. Each of the mobile agent Ai will be migrate to different hosts to collect
information. At the expiration time τ , all the mobile agents Ai will send the
chaining of the “offers” from the dynamic data section to the bulletin board.
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Algorithm 23 Initialization of (m,n) ElGamal threshold signature
1: TTP choose a hash function h
2: TTP choose a secure elliptic curve E so that it has a subgroup of order q where
q is suitably large
3: User U selects the polynomial f(r) = xU + a1r+ a2r
2 + · · ·+ am−1rm−1 of degree
at most (m− 1)
4: The user U secret key xU = f(0)
5: The user U public key YU = xUG
6: For each i, the share si is calculated as si = ui +f(ri) where ui ∈R Zq \0, and the
ri are public (i = 1, 2, ..., n) . si and ui are placed in the agent Ai’s static data
section. All values r1, . . . , rn are also placed on the static data section of mobile
agent Ai.
7: User U calculates the public elements Si and Zi where Si = siG and Zi = uiG
these are associated with mobile agents Ai ∈ A. The points S1, . . . , Sn, Z1, . . . , Zn
are placed in agent Ai’s static data section
8: The parameters (h, q,G, YU) together with {(Si, Zi)|Ai ∈ A}
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Table 6.7.: Data Structure of Multiple Mobile Agents
Agent No. Ai Bulletin Board No. BBi Title of Agent
Routing Table
Time Stamp
Environmental Key K
Share Signing Key Parameters (ri, Si, Zi)
Instruction Set
Static Data
Expiration Time τ
Dynamic Data DD
Vcert={gr, gti , gzi , α, βi, and λi}
Share of Signing Key (si, ui)
Public One-Off Key QAi
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How the host H executes mobile agent Ai is presented in Algorithm 24.
Algorithm 24 Host executes Mobile Agent
1: Uses Vcerti to verify the mobile agent Ai
2: Checks the revocation list of malicious users
3: if Mobile agent Ai belongs to the malicious user U then
4: Stops executing and reports to TTP
5: Checks the expiration time τ
6: if Expiration time τ is reached then
7: Sends mobile agent Ai to bulletin board BB
8: else
9: Executes the mobile agent instructions set
10: Check the environmental key K in database to see if any Product matches the
environmental key K.
11: if There is no match then
12: Send mobile agent A〉 to the next host Hi+1
13: else
14: Uses the environmental key K as a decrypt key to decrypt the instruction
set and execute it
15: Signs the offer in the dynamic data DD of mobile agent by using hash chain-
ing to protect the offer
16: Send the mobile agent Ai to the next host Hi+1
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Table 6.8.: Multiple Mobile Agent Data Structure
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Table 6.8.: Multiple Mobile Agent Data Structure
AID :d4d5db87449hdkwa BBID :ab859g “Book an flight ticket”
ar.jal.com 213.171.166.525
delta.com 198.193.60.50
aa.com 151.174.224.81
china-airlines.com 205.116.44.33
11:32 PM EST
Environmental Key K = h(“flight ticket′′)
Share Signing Key Parameters (ri, Si, Zi)
Instruction Set
if(AID is in revoking list)
reports to TTP
if(Expiration time τ is reached)
sends agent to bulletin board BB
if(h(Product) == K) then
decrypt the code in below by using “Product′′ {
for m in Host which is flies from Michigan to Chicago do{
if preference(m) > 0 then
write offer in dynamic data by using hash chaining}}
sends agent to next host
Static Data
Expiration Time τ
Dynamic Data
Virtual Certificate Vcert={gr, gt, gz, α, β, λ }
gr 114 44 2 35 39 155 135 2 65 60 74 57 18 98 8 237
gt 191 14 214 13 194 213 82 165 169 178 216 34 162 178 39 102
gz 209 47 145 134 206 97 131 118 32 109 221 69 19 51 209 161
α 42 0 180 18 204 19 7 93 116 242 84 26 8 138 159 21
β 65 202 243 141 237 66 195 234 254 187 210 0 5 95 255 251
λ 158 10 245 94 250 223 124 141 91 82 45 163 192 124 237 123
Share of Signing Key (si, ui)
Public One-Off Key QAi
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6.5.3 Host of Mobile Agents make the Decision
There are six phases to purchase the targeted item. Host of agent uploads the
dynamic data to bulletin board, host of agent downloads all the offers from the bulletin
board, host of agents generates partial signature and uploads to bulletin board, host of
agent downloads all the partial secret key from bulletin board, purchases and contact
the merchant host Hm and user U , and get signature verified by merchant and bank.
Phase One: Agents upload the Dynamic Data to BB All the hosts wait for
∆ time after the expiration time τ is reached and send the dynamic data DD
to bulletin board BB (see Figure 6.7).
Fig. 6.7.: Host of agents upload the Dynamic Data to Bulletin Board
Phase Two: Agent download all the offers from BB Host of agents downloads
all the offers from the bulletin board BB after ∆ time. All host of agents verify
all of the the hash chains ci (see Figure 6.8, Algorithm 25, and Figure 6.9).
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Fig. 6.8.: Host of agents download all the Dynamic Data from Bulletin Board
Phase Three: Agents Generate Partial Signature and upload to BB Host of
agents computes the best offer and generate the partial signature for δ time.
Each agent Ai collects all the offers from all agents. The mobile agents Ai
constructs a partial signature which is the user U sharing key using Algorithm
25. All the host of agents should compute the same best offer, since the best
offer is a deterministic computation (part of the instruction set), so no extra
communication is needed. They then partially sign the best offer using their
share of the signing key, which is in the data structure of the agent. Lastly, the
host of agent uploads the best offer with the partial signature sigKey on bulletin
board BB.
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Algorithm 25 Partial Signature Generation of (m,n) ElGamal threshold signa-
ture
1: For each i, agent Ai generates a secret key ki ≤ q− 1 . Now computes Ri = kiG.
The host of agent Ai posts Ri on bulletin board BB
2: Agent Ai downloads R1, · · · , Rn from bulletin board BB
3: Once active agent subset B ⊂ A is known, each agent Ai ∈ B computes R and v
, where R =
∑
Ai∈B
Ri and v ≡ h( best offer, R) mod q
4: Agents Ai generates their partial signature by (si, ki) Note sigKeyAi ≡
si
∏
Ai∈B;j 6=i
−rj
ri − rj + kiv mod q
5: The partial signature sigKeyAi is placed in agent Ai.
Fig. 6.9.: Host of agents upload the partial key with the best offer to Bulletin Board
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Phase Four: Agents downloads all the Partial Signatures from BB Host of
agents downloads all the partial signatures sigKeyAi and the best offer from
bulletin board BB.
Fig. 6.10.: Hosts downloads all the partial keys to Bulletin Board
Algorithm 26 Final Signature (m,n) ElGamal threshold signature
1: Agent Ai downloads all partial signatures (offer, sigKeyAi) from B that are on the
bulletin board BB and verify the partial signatures by checking sigKeyAiG
2: sigKeyAiG ≡
∏
Aj∈B;j 6=i
−rj
ri − rjSi + vRi
3: If All partial signature are congruence
4: Computes σ =
∑
Ai∈B
sigKeyAi mod q
5: The (B, R, σ) is the signature of best offer
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Phase Five: Purchasing and Contacts the Host and User The host of agents
construct the final signature sigKey (see Algorithm 26). The signature that the
host of agents reconstruct is the user’s signature of the best offer with their
secret key sigKey. The host sends the signature to the merchant who provides
the best offer.
Phase Six: Merchant and Bank verify the Signature The merchant who made
the best offer in the hosts receives the signature sigKey with the best offer. It
will verify the signature sigKey by using Algorithm 27. If the signature is au-
thentic then it will send the product to the user U and take the signature sigKey
to the bank to get the money. The bank will also use the same Algorithm 27
to verify the signature sigKey.
Algorithm 27 Verification (m,n) ElGamal threshold signature
1: Compute T =
∑
Ai∈B
∏
Aj∈B
j 6=i
−rj
ri − rjZi
2: Check σG
?≡ Y + T + eR where v ≡ h( best offer, R) mod q
6.6 TTP Tracing and Revoking the Malicious Users
In order to reduce risk and protect the hosts, the hosts can submit the Vcert of the
malicious agent to TTP . Since the TTP stored the IDU , YU , AU , wU , and Rx(AU)
−1G
into the database during the registration, it has the ability to find out who is the one
releases the malicious mobile agents in O(1) using hash table method. TTP would
penalize the user U and announce the malicious user ID to revocation list to prevent
more damage. See Algorithm 28
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Algorithm 28 Host complains Mobile Agent
1: TTP received complaint from the host with the virtual certificate of mobile agent
Vcert={gr, gt, gz, α, β,QA, λ}
2: TTP checks the database to find Rx(AU)
−1G.
3: TTP announces the malicious user ID and AU
Table 6.9.: Revocation List
User ID AU
IDU 1 AU 1
IDU 2 AU 2
.
.
.
.
.
.
IDUn AUn
6.7 Bulletin Board Store Signature, Output, and Time
When the expiration time τ is reached, all the mobile agents would be sent to the
bulletin board BB by the hosts. At most n−m mobile agents can reside on a host H
and m mobile agents must be sent to the bulletin board BB. All the host of mobile
agents will use the bulletin board BB to communicate to each others.
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7. CONCLUSION
In this thesis we applied the “An Anonymous Authentication Protocol: Achieving
Privacy with Trust” to construct a “Secure Mobile Agent E-commerce Protocol”.
We described the preparation of mobile agents and presented the mobile agent data
structure. Also, we presented the hash chaining to secure the collected information
that mobile agents store the servers’ offers in dynamic data and protect the offers
from modifying during the migration. Moreover, we described the environmental
key to protect the user privacy. In addition, we use a threshold sharing signature
approach to allow the mobile agents to decide and purchase the targeted item for the
user from the merchant. In the future work, we could add a two steps verification to
verify the final transaction with the costumers. Also, there is a long term parameter
in virtual certificate parameters. This long term parameter never change when user
reconstructs a mobile agent but it helps us to complete the tracing, however, this
could let the hosts have an ability to profiling an anonymous customer. The host
could know that someone bought some items before but they never knew the details
about the costumer. However, we might want to be more anonymous, secure, and
still enable the tracing in this protocol.
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